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Immigration, Criminalization, and 
Disobedience 
ALLEGRA M. MCLEOD* 
This symposium essay explores two contending visions 
of immigration justice: one focused on expanding proce-
dural rights for immigrants, and a second associated with a 
movement of immigrant youth who have come out en masse 
as “undocumented and unafraid,” issuing a fundamental 
challenge to immigration restrictionism. As immigration en-
forcement in the United States increasingly relies on crimi-
nal prosecution and detention, advocates for reform have in-
creasingly turned to constitutional criminal procedure, seek-
ing greater procedural protections for immigrants. But this 
essay argues that this focus on enhanced procedural protec-
tions is woefully incomplete as a vision of immigration jus-
tice. Although a right to counsel, for example, may provide 
comfort and aid to certain vulnerable individuals, such pro-
cedural protections are unlikely to change the quasi-crimi-
nal character of immigration enforcement or to address the 
plight of the millions of people without a path to lawful sta-
tus. Just as U.S. constitutional criminal procedure failed to 
ameliorate the harshness of substantive criminal law, more 
robust immigration procedural protections would likely fail 
to reorient immigration enforcement in a more humane di-
rection. By contrast, a growing movement of immigrant 
                                                                                                             
* Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I owe thanks to David 
Abraham, Linda Bosniak, Paul Butler, Jason Cade, Anne Fleming, Daniel Kan-
stroom, Prerna Lal, Stephen Lee, Derin McLeod, Doug NeJaime, Sherally Mun-
shi, and Sruti Swaminathan for helpful discussion of these ideas, and especially 
to the University of Miami Law Review editors for organizing this symposium on 
Criminalized Justice: Consequences of Punitive Policy. 
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youth offers a more expansive conception of immigration re-
form. As these immigrant youth lay claim to a “right to re-
main,” infiltrate immigration detention centers, and crash 
the border, they have reshaped our political and legal dis-
course, gesturing towards an alternative vision of immigra-
tion justice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There are more than fifty million people worldwide internally 
displaced in camps or living as refugees, often in desperate condi-
tions, in squalid tents, dependent on handouts of food, with little or 
no access to clean drinking water or health care to prevent outbreaks 
of cholera, malaria and other diseases.1 Thousands more die each 
year attempting to flee conditions of poverty and violence by sea or 
in the desert borderlands that separate the United States from Mex-
ico.2 Of those who succeed in crossing the U.S. border, approxi-
mately eleven million live in the United States without lawful im-
migration status, under the threat of deportation or removal.3 The 
United States confines and removes roughly 400,000 of these immi-
grant men, women, and children each year,4 holding these persons 
                                                                                                             
 1 See World Refugee Day: Global Forced Displacement Tops 50 Million for 
First Time in Post-World War II Era, UNITED NATIONS REFUGEE AGENCY (June 
20, 2014), http://www.unhcr.org/53a155bc6.html. 
 2 See INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, FATAL JOURNEYS: TRACKING LIVES LOST 
DURING MIGRATION 11, 22 (Tara Brian & Frank Laczko eds., 2014). 
 3 See Julia Preston, Illegal Immigrants Number 11.5 Million, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 24, 2012, at A14. 
 4 See Gretchen Gavett, Map: The U.S. Immigration Detention Boom, PBS 
(Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/race-multicul-
tural/lost-in-detention/map-the-u-s-immigration-detention-boom/. 
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in detention centers, jails, and prisons, in cuffs, shackles, behind 
barbed wire, subject to solitary confinement for rule violations.5 In 
the face of these circumstances, there is increasing awareness that 
the United States’ immigration regulatory regime is “broken” and in 
need of thoroughgoing repair.6 
Much immigration law scholarship and advocacy in the United 
States urges that certain of these problems could be at least partially 
redressed by extending to immigrants enhanced judicially enforced 
procedural protections, especially a right to counsel. In 1984, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held in Immigration and Naturalization Service 
v. Lopez-Mendoza that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
does not apply in immigration proceedings because, among other 
reasons, these proceedings are civil rather than criminal.7 Reversing 
I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza would ensure, or so these accounts suggest, 
those constitutional protections that would flow from recognizing 
immigration proceedings as criminal or quasi-criminal rather than 
civil.8 Recognizing immigration proceedings as quasi-criminal 
                                                                                                             
 5 See Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration Detention: No Turning Back?, 113 
S. ATLANTIC Q. 621 (2014); Alison Mountz et al., Conceptualizing Detention: 
Mobility, Containment, Bordering, and Exclusion, PROG. HUM. GEOGR. 1 (2012). 
 6 See, e.g., Taking Action on Immigration, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/immigration (last visited Sept. 17, 2015) 
(“America’s immigration system is broken.”). 
 7 See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984); Fong 
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (noting that because depor-
tation is not punishment, “the provision[]of the constitution . . . prohibiting unrea-
sonable searches and seizures . . . ha[s] no application”). 
 8 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration 
Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 
1563, 1623 (2010) (“The application of the exclusionary rule to removal proceed-
ings is a meritorious proposal to address the procedural problems previously dis-
cussed. . . .”); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: 
Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 
1897, 1935 (2000) (“We should view deportation functionally and treat it as sub-
ject to the type of constitutional limitations placed on analogous government con-
trol of individual behavior.”) (“It is time to recognize that deportation . . . is pun-
ishment. If it must be done, then it must be done with specific, substantive consti-
tutional protections. It should at the very least not be done retroactively, without 
counsel, or without a right to bail.”); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-
Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immi-
gration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 350–51 (2008) 
(exploring how the protections of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Ex 
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could enable not just application of an exclusionary rule in immi-
gration proceedings, but also a right to appointed counsel, among 
other protections—revolutionizing constitutional immigration pro-
cedure as did the Warren Court revolution in constitutional criminal 
procedure.9 In the meantime, advocates have organized outside the 
courts to expand access to counsel and other procedural protections 
in immigration cases.10 
This symposium essay will explore why this focus on procedural 
enhancement is woefully incomplete as a vision of immigration jus-
tice, even as it serves to protect certain vulnerable individuals. Alt-
hough a right to counsel, for example, may provide comfort and aid 
to certain vulnerable individuals, such procedural protections are 
unlikely to change the quasi-criminal character of immigration en-
forcement or to address the plight of the millions of people without 
a path to lawful status. Just as the Warren Court revolution in con-
stitutional criminal procedure failed to ameliorate the harshness of 
substantive criminal law, more robust immigration procedural pro-
tections would likely fail to reorient immigration enforcement in a 
more humane and sustainable direction. 
By contrast, this essay will consider an alternative vision of im-
migration justice associated with a growing movement of immigrant 
youth activists who have come out en masse as “undocumented and 
unafraid.”11 As these youth activists call for an end to deportations, 
                                                                                                             
Post Facto Clause, the exclusionary rule and other federal evidentiary rules, and 
criminal due process venue requirements should be applied in certain immigration 
proceedings); Marc L. Miller, Immigration Law: Assessing New Immigration En-
forcement Strategies and the Criminalization of Migration, 51 EMORY L.J. 963, 
972 (2002). 
 9 See, e.g., Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread Con-
stitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for 
Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109 (2008); Jonathan L. Hafetz, 
The Rule of Egregiousness: INS v. Lopez-Mendoza Reconsidered, 19 WHITTIER 
L. REV. 843, 845–46 (1998); Developments in the Law: Immigrant Rights & Im-
migration Enforcement, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1657 (2013). 
 10 See, e.g., NEW YORK IMMIGRANT FAMILY UNITY PROJECT, IMPROVING 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS (2015), http://www.national-
consortium.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/National%20Consortium/Confer-
ences/2015/Materials/Improving-ATJ-in-Deportation-Proceedings.ashx. 
 11 See WALTER J. NICHOLLS, THE DREAMERS: HOW THE UNDOCUMENTED 
YOUTH MOVEMENT TRANFORMED THE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS DEBATE 1-7 (2013). 
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initiate populist legal mobilizations, and engage in acts of civil dis-
obedience, they gesture towards a broader vision of political and le-
gal reform.12 Through their bold, disruptive actions and discontent 
with immigration restrictionism, these youth offer the preliminary 
contours of an immigration reform agenda for which procedural pro-
tections may serve as a partial means but which is decidedly com-
mitted to other ends.13 
I. HOPE FOR A REVOLUTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL IMMIGRATION 
PROCEDURE? 
The litigation that culminated in I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza began 
with two separate immigration raids in 1976 and 1977.14 Immigra-
tion enforcement officers arrested Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias 
Sandoval-Sanchez at their separate places of employment.15 Both 
Lopez-Mendoza and Sandoval-Sanchez were placed in deportation 
proceedings and both sought to have their proceedings terminated 
on the grounds that their arrests violated the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.16 
Until 1979, when the Board of Immigration Appeals declined to 
apply the exclusionary rule in a separate deportation case, the exclu-
sionary rule was understood to apply in deportation proceedings and 
the major treatise in immigration law reported that the exclusionary 
rule was available to individuals facing deportation.17 The immigra-
tion judges in Sandoval-Sanchez and Lopez-Mendoza’s cases, how-
ever, declined to suppress the evidence in question, entered orders 
of deportation in both cases, and the Board of Immigration Appeals 
affirmed.18 
                                                                                                             
 12 See id.; see also Luisa Laura Heredia, Of Radicals and DREAMers: Har-
nessing Exceptionality to Challenge Immigration Control, 9 ASSOC. MEXICAN-
AMERICAN EDUCATORS (AMAE) 74 (2015); Michael May, Los Infiltradores, THE 
AM. PROSPECT (June 21, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/los-infiltradores. 
 13 See Leti Volpp, Civility and the Undocumented Alien, in CIVILITY, 
LEGALITY AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 92–95 (edited by Austin Sarat) (2014). 
 14 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1035–37. 
 15 See id. 
 16 See id. 
 17 See id. at 1059 (White, J., dissenting) (citing C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5.2c at 5–31 (rev. ed. 1980)). 
 18 See id. at 1035–38. 
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed.19 In reversing Sandoval-Sanchez’s deportation order, 
the Ninth Circuit held that his arrest and detention violated the 
Fourth Amendment, that his admission of illegal entry was the prod-
uct of this unconstitutional detention, and that the exclusionary rule 
barred its use in a deportation proceeding.20 The court vacated 
Lopez-Mendoza’s deportation order and remanded for further re-
view of the alleged Fourth Amendment violations in his case.21 
But the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion authored 
by Justice O’Connor, reasoned that the civil nature of a deportation 
proceeding rendered the various procedural protections that attach 
in the context of a criminal trial, including the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule, generally inapplicable: “A deportation proceed-
ing is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this 
country, not to punish an unlawful entry, though entering or remain-
ing unlawfully in this country is itself a crime.”22 To determine 
whether the exclusionary rule applies notwithstanding the civil des-
ignation of immigration proceedings, the majority balanced what it 
determined to be the minimal deterrent benefit of the exclusionary 
rule in this context against the considerable cost of permitting a per-
son to remain in the United States when his continuing presence, in 
the majority’s estimation, “constitutes a crime.”23 
The majority noted, however, that its “conclusions concerning 
the exclusionary rule’s value might change, if there developed good 
reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers 
were widespread.”24 The majority also left open the remedy of ex-
clusion under the Due Process Clause in the case of “egregious vio-
lations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress 
notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value 
of the evidence obtained.”25 
                                                                                                             
 19 Lopez-Mendoza v. I.N.S., 705 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1983), rev’d, 468 U.S. 
1032 (1984). 
 20 Id. at 1063. 
 21 Id. at 1075. 
 22 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038. 
 23 Id. at 1047. 
 24 Id. at 1050. 
 25 Id. at 1050–51. 
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Justices White, Brennan, Stevens, and Marshall dissented. Jus-
tice White, in a dissent joined by Justices Brennan, Stevens, and 
Marshall, objected to the majority’s “incorrect assessment of the 
costs and benefits of applying the rule in such proceedings . . . .”26 
According to Justice White, “INS agents are law enforcement offi-
cials whose mission is closely analogous to that of police officers 
and because civil deportation proceedings are to INS agents what 
criminal trials are to police officers,” the deterrent effect of exclu-
sion in immigration proceedings is likely equivalent to its effect in 
criminal proceedings.27 Further, the dissenters discredited the ma-
jority’s account that it is a “continuing crime” for a non-citizen to 
be present in the United States when he or she entered without au-
thorization, underscoring that the few cases to construe the criminal 
unlawful entry statute have held “that a violation takes place at the 
time of entry and that the statute does not describe a continuing of-
fense.”28 
Justice Brennan put forward an additional basis for dissent in a 
separate opinion: that the exclusionary rule is “found in the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment itself” and is not only applicable 
by virtue of the weight of its deterrent force relative to its costs.29 
Justice Marshall likewise emphasized the “constitutionally man-
dated character of the exclusionary rule”: 
[A] sufficient reason for excluding from civil depor-
tation proceedings evidence obtained in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment is that there is no other way 
to achieve the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to 
avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness 
and of assuring the people—all potential victims of 
unlawful government conduct—that the government 
would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus min-
imizing the risk of seriously undermining popular 
trust in government.30 
                                                                                                             
 26 Id. at 1052 (White, J., dissenting). 
 27 Id. at 1053 (White, J., dissenting). 
 28 Id. at 1056–57 (White, J., dissenting). 
 29 See id. at 1051 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 30 Id. at 1060–61 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
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Despite the force of the arguments of the dissenters, the Lopez-
Mendoza majority opinion has informed immigration procedure for 
more than thirty years, limiting the procedural rights available to the 
millions of individuals who have been removed from the United 
States during this period. In many instances, suppression and termi-
nation are the only means to protect a person facing removal from 
being returned to a country where he or she may face poverty, vio-
lence, separation from his or her family, and other grave personal 
harms. 
Accordingly, numerous commentators have argued for the re-
versal of Lopez-Mendoza on two grounds: the first relates to the ap-
plicability of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings; the 
second concerns the designation of immigration proceedings as 
purely civil, thereby curtailing the application of other criminal pro-
cedure rights to these proceedings, particularly a right to counsel.31 
Though the remedy of suppression remains available in immigration 
court under Lopez-Mendoza for “egregious” violations, many cases 
are lost due to the absence of more robust procedural protections in 
immigration court.32 The more routine availability of the remedy of 
suppression—and the recognition of the “close connection” between 
                                                                                                             
 31 See, e.g., Elias, supra note 9; Developments in the Law: Immigrant Rights 
& Immigration Enforcement, supra note 9, at 1657 (“The status quo is failing. 
Lower courts have attempted but largely failed to transform Lopez-Mendoza’s 
vague notion of egregiousness into a workable standard consistent with contem-
porary exclusionary rule doctrine. . . . Most importantly, changes to immigration 
enforcement . . . have undermined the decision’s analysis and amplified its distin-
guishing flaws, in particular its de facto exemption of ICE from meaningful 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. In short, the case for starting over has never been 
stronger.”). 
 32 See Elizabeth A. Rossi, Revisiting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza: Why the Fourth 
Amendment Exclusionary Rule Should Apply in Deportation Proceedings, 44 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 477, 478, 507–26, 513 (2013) (discussing numerous 
cases in which courts have found Fourth Amendment violations insufficiently se-
vere to be classified as egregious, and noting one case in which the Seventh Cir-
cuit found the exclusionary rule inapplicable, Gutierrez-Berdin v. Holder, 
where—in the course of a suspicionless, warrantless arrest—agents yelled at 
Gutierrez-Berdin, handcuffed him, and told him: “Sign the fucking papers. You 
don’t have any rights.”). But see Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 
1017–19 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding it appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule to 
suppress evidence in immigration proceedings when the evidence was obtained 
during an illegal home raid, where officers entered the home without a warrant, 
consent, or exigent circumstances). 
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the immigration and criminal processes33—would allow more vul-
nerable people to avoid deportation or removal, an outcome that 
might otherwise be unattainable.34 
There are also strong arguments that the factors that animated 
the Lopez-Mendoza majority opinion now, three decades later, sug-
gest the continued, even increased, importance of the reintroduction 
of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings. There is com-
pelling evidence of widespread Fourth Amendment violations by 
INS’ successor agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”), which the majority in Lopez-Mendoza acknowledged ex-
plicitly as a circumstance that would support a different result.35 Ad-
ditionally, immigration and criminal proceedings have become in-
creasingly entwined, rendering perhaps inapt the civil designation 
attached to immigration enforcement, or at least altering the balanc-
ing of deterrence benefits versus costs relied on by the majority in 
Lopez-Mendoza. 
Should we hope, then, for a revolution in constitutional immi-
gration procedure analogous to the Warren Court revolution in con-
stitutional criminal procedure? Would expanded procedural protec-
tions serve to repair certain of the failings of U.S. immigration law? 
Although the application of the exclusionary rule in immigration 
proceedings is an amply justified corrective to the harshness and 
abuse that often characterizes immigration enforcement, the short 
answer is that, whatever its modest advantages, a procedural rights 
revolution ought not to constitute the sum total, or even the major 
part, of an agenda for immigration justice. 
Of course, an expansion of procedural rights in the immigration 
context, particularly the right to counsel, would at least partly ad-
dress the serious needs of a vulnerable group of people for individ-
ualized consideration of their cases. But enhanced procedural pro-
tections will have limited success in advancing greater immigration 
justice, and emphasizing the quasi-criminal nature of immigration 
enforcement also poses underappreciated risks and threatens unde-
sired consequences. 
                                                                                                             
 33 The United States Supreme Court more recently acknowledged this close 
connection between criminal and immigration processes in Padilla v. Kentucky, 
559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010). 
 34 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366. 
 35 See, e.g., Elias, supra note 9, at 1128–35. 
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The expansion of procedural rights would do little to address the 
vulnerability of those millions of people without any path to lawful 
status in the United States despite long residence, or that of the mil-
lions more who are trapped in camps, the hundreds of thousands de-
tained in immigration prisons each year, or those who die trying to 
cross the border.36 Even as lawyers may provide some comfort and 
aid to those persons in removal proceedings, without more thor-
oughgoing reform to substantive immigration law, more widespread 
legal representation and enhanced procedural protections promise 
relatively minimal change. 
A further concern with this procedural rights reform agenda is 
that this approach may further ingrain the interconnections between 
criminal and immigration enforcement. Yet, if expanded procedural 
rights are to have the presumably desired effect of mitigating the 
harshness of immigration enforcement, resituating immigration law 
and policy outside a quasi-criminal framework may be necessary. 
But decriminalizing immigration enforcement stands in potential 
conflict with an emphasis on the quasi-criminal nature of deporta-
tion that animates much of the procedural rights reform agenda. 
There are, certainly, other ways to reach the result of expanded 
procedural protections in immigration proceedings beyond revers-
ing Lopez-Mendoza’s (and Fong Yue Ting’s37) holdings that immi-
gration enforcement is a civil rather than criminal or quasi-criminal 
process. For example, in J.E.F.M. v. Holder, a class of juveniles in 
removal proceedings have claimed they are entitled to a lawyer to 
represent them at government expense in connection with their im-
migration cases under, inter alia, the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause. In his order denying the government’s motion to dismiss, 
Judge Thomas Zilly of the U.S. District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Washington recognized: 
A fundamental precept of due process is that individ-
uals have a right “to be heard ‘at a meaningful time 
                                                                                                             
 36 Some of the analysis in this Part draws from my recent article on criminal-
immigration law enforcement. See Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immi-
gration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 169 
(2012). 
 37 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893). 
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and in a meaningful manner’” before “being con-
demned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even 
though it may not involve the stigma and hardships 
of a criminal conviction.” . . . . Unlike some other 
legal doctrines, due process is “not a technical con-
ception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place 
and circumstances,” but rather is “flexible and calls 
for such procedural protections as the particular situ-
ation demands.”38   . . The removal proceedings at 
issue in this case pit juveniles against the full force 
of the federal government . . . . Moreover, courts 
have repeatedly recognized “[w]ith only a small de-
gree of hyperbole” that the immigration laws are 
“second only to the Internal Revenue Code in com-
plexity.” . . . .39 Although the financial constraints 
and border-policing concerns raised by defendants 
must play a role in any analysis concerning plaintiffs’ 
assertion of a right to appointed counsel under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, at this 
juncture, they are not sufficiently quantified or de-
veloped to allow the Court to engage in the balancing 
required . . . .40 
Importantly, Judge Zilly noted the critical importance of juvenile 
access to counsel in immigration proceedings without likening those 
proceedings in any respect to criminal proceedings. 41 
                                                                                                             
 38 Order at 6–7, J.E.F.M. v. Holder, No. 14-1026 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 
2015), ECF No. 114 (internal citations omitted), https://www.aclu.org/sites/de-
fault/files/field_document/jefm_v_holder_mtd_order_4_13_15.pdf. 
 39 Order at 30, J.E.F.M. v. Holder, No. 14-1026 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2015), 
ECF No. 114 (internal citations omitted), https://www.aclu.org/sites/de-
fault/files/field_document/jefm_v_holder_mtd_order_4_13_15.pdf. 
 40 Order at 36, J.E.F.M. v. Holder, No. 14-1026 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2015), 
ECF No. 114 (internal citations omitted), https://www.aclu.org/sites/de-
fault/files/field_document/jefm_v_holder_mtd_order_4_13_15.pdf. 
 41 Id. at 33 n.26 (“Youth, however, generally correlates with a lack of profi-
ciency in reading and comprehension, even in a native language. For those whose 
school-age years were stained by violence, poverty, parental neglect, or similar 
hardships, literacy might be an as-yet unachieved goal. . . . [E]ven when juveniles 
successfully navigate themselves to removal proceedings, age might still play a 
role in increasing their risk of receiving an erroneous ruling.”). 
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But beyond the problems associated with characterizing immi-
gration proceedings as quasi-criminal, a separate concern involves 
the actual impact of process protections on criminal law administra-
tion. Attending closely to the harshness and dysfunction of the U.S. 
criminal process—where defendants have access to a full panoply 
of constitutional procedural rights, including the benefit of the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and the Sixth Amendment 
right to appointed counsel—illuminates some of the further poten-
tial limits of the proceduralist project as a framework for immigra-
tion justice. 
Enhanced procedural protections may be confused in this work 
for meaningfully transformative substantive ends, in part because of 
a general inattention to the outcomes associated with procedural 
rights in the criminal context. For instance, the Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal cases often offers 
minimal protection as the vast majority of criminal defendants plead 
guilty in rushed proceedings and the resources and quality of coun-
sel for indigents—disproportionately poor people of color— are fre-
quently deficient. Stephen Bright and Sia Sanneh describe fifty 
years of failure to implement a right to effective counsel in criminal 
cases in these terms: 
Every day in thousands of courtrooms across the na-
tion, from top-tier trial courts that handle felony 
cases to municipal courts that serve as cash cows for 
their communities, the right to counsel is violated. 
Judges conduct hearings in which poor people ac-
cused of crimes and poor children charged with acts 
of delinquency appear without lawyers. Many plead 
guilty without lawyers. Others plead guilty and are 
sentenced after learning about plea offers from law-
yers they met moments before and will never see 
again. Innocent people plead guilty to get out of jail. 
Virtually all cases are resolved in this manner in 
many courts, particularly municipal and misde-
meanor courts, which handle an enormous volume of 
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cases. But it is also how many felony cases are re-
solved.42 
Moreover, despite the Eighth Amendment’s protection against 
cruel and unusual punishments, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld 
even life sentences for relatively minor offenses, for example, for a 
nonviolent recidivist offender who sought to pass a forged check in 
the amount of $88.30.43 Further, according to one of the leading 
Criminal Procedure case books, the exclusionary rule itself is sub-
ject to so many exceptions that in fact, “[c]umulatively, the excep-
tions may be the rule.”44 Yet, as Paul Butler has explained, the right 
to counsel in criminal proceedings nonetheless “invests the criminal 
justice system with a veneer of impartiality”45 
Other potential problems that may be associated with a proce-
dural rights revolution in the immigration context are elucidated by 
the work of William J. Stuntz and Charles D. Weisselberg in their 
respective studies of the Warren Court revolution in constitutional 
criminal procedure. Stuntz has revealed how the combination of ro-
bust procedural protections and a political commitment to aggres-
sive crime control coincided with pervasive exceptions to proce-
                                                                                                             
 42 Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance 
After Gideon, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2152 (2013); see also Stephen B. Bright, 
Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the 
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dural safeguards and with an excessive ratcheting up of the harsh-
ness of substantive criminal law.46 This one-way ratchet is a product 
in part of legislative and public perceptions that procedural protec-
tions interfere with the efficient regulation of crime—a misimpres-
sion to which “politicians responded with a forty-year backlash of 
overcriminalization and overpunishment.”47 
In his study, Mourning Miranda, Charles Weisselberg focuses 
on the influence of Miranda v. Arizona’s regime of warnings and 
waivers on custodial interrogation practices.48 He finds that Mi-
randa ultimately failed to secure the voluntariness of suspects’ par-
ticipation in custodial interrogations because the warnings “cohere[] 
with a sophisticated psychological approach to police interrogation, 
rather than operating apart from it as the Miranda Court intended.”49 
Weisselberg laments that Miranda’s prescribed procedures—what 
he regards as Miranda’s “hollow ritual”—distract from whether the 
values sought to be served by the procedure are actually protected.50 
The import of this is not that the Warren Court revolution in con-
stitutional criminal procedure caused the escalating brutality of 
criminal law enforcement in the years that followed, or that it is re-
sponsible for other forms excesses in U.S. criminal law administra-
tion. Nor is it to suggest that a parallel rights revolution in the im-
migration context would result in increased severity in immigration 
enforcement. But just as the revolution in criminal procedure rights 
failed to transform the excesses of substantive criminal law, a revo-
lution in immigration procedure would likely fail to reorient immi-
gration enforcement, particularly without a clearly articulated hori-
zon for reform beyond the expansion of procedural protections. 
What, then, might serve as meaningful horizon for immigration 
reform beyond more expansive procedural protections? And how 
might the law act in service of those ends? The bold actions of im-
migrant youth activists calling for a different form of immigration 
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justice—as they come out as “undocumented and unafraid,” “work 
cases,” and infiltrate immigration detention centers in their “#NotO-
neMoreDeportation” and “Bring Them Home” campaigns—offer 
surprising and compelling alternative conceptions of just immigra-
tion reform far beyond mere procedural enhancement, and beyond 
the limited path to citizenship and liberalization associated with 
comprehensive immigration reform.51 
II. DISOBEDIENT DREAMERS 
Through wide-ranging civil disobedience, undocumented youth 
activists have begun to catalyze a capacious, far-reaching agenda for 
immigration justice.52 These youth activists became politicized as 
they organized to pass the Development, Relief, and Education for 
Alien Minors Act (or DREAM Act) to address their own unauthor-
ized immigration statuses.53 After multiple Congresses failed to pass 
immigration legislation, the Dreamers—frustrated with the dysfunc-
tion of conventional political and legal processes—began to “work 
cases” themselves in their own communities.54 In “working cases,” 
the youth activists identified sympathetic individuals facing depor-
tation or removal, produced and distributed videos on the internet, 
reached out to the press, coordinated petition drives, and persuaded 
legislators and other influential community members to send letters 
of support.55 Through this work, the youth spearheaded a form of 
populist legal engagement, achieving legal outcomes, such as the 
termination of removal proceedings, by laying claim to a higher 
form of law—one that recognized, in their words, a human “right to 
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remain.”56 As they worked cases, the youth activists themselves in-
creasingly came out as “undocumented and unafraid,”57 and their 
work coalesced into a continuing call for “not one more deporta-
tion.”58 In the process, the youth built power in their communities—
a core tenet of their advocacy projects—and began to hone their re-
formist vocabulary, oriented ultimately toward goals beyond imme-
diately achievable immigration reform in Congress, court victories, 
or otherwise expanded procedural protections.59 
One of the immigrant youth organizers, Mohammad Abdollahi, 
has explained how the initial campaigns around individual cases 
sparked the idea for detention center infiltrations: “it would literally 
work like dominoes. We would do one case, and then we had some-
body else contact us.”60 The activists then planned to scale it up to 
help a larger group of people by covertly gaining access to the inside 
of a detention center and organizing there.61 Inside the detention 
center, the youth activists would be able to access new information 
and call additional attention to their work. 
In their first detention center infiltration in 2013, a group of five 
undocumented youth members of the National Immigrant Youth Al-
liance (NIYA), organized to infiltrate Broward Transitional Center, 
a GEO detention facility near Fort Lauderdale, Florida.62 The plan 
was to organize the men and women inside and obtain information 
from individuals detained there so that the youth activists could 
work their cases, identify immigrants eligible for relief, and generate 
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media attention to the inhumanity and arbitrariness in immigration 
law enforcement.63 
The Broward detention facility is gender-segregated, so the or-
ganizers arranged for Carlos Saavedra to work with the men follow-
ing his arrest and for Lulu Martinez to organize the women.64 Mo-
hammed Abdollahi would publicize the cases from outside the de-
tention facility and coordinate the outreach campaign.65 The organ-
izers selected seventy detained individuals and began campaigns 
around their cases.66 The activists report that their initial victory 
came swiftly, as they won release for a Dreamer who had spent five 
months in detention shortly after the youth organizers publicized his 
story.67 After just two weeks in detention, Saavedra and Martinez 
had met with hundreds of detainees.68 Using the detention facility’s 
pay phones, the NIYA organizers began to conduct interviews with 
media outlets.69 As soon as the facility became aware of their pres-
ence, the organizers were released with a stern warning, but they 
continued to advocate in support of their Broward cases.70 The 
NIYA activists report that their work contributed to freeing at least 
forty detainees, and it garnered national and international atten-
tion.71 
Rather than merely retracing established narratives associated 
with procedural reform, in the criminal context or otherwise, the 
youth sought to identify deeply resonant values in American civic 
culture that conflict with pervasive immigration enforcement prac-
tices.72 By exposing those contradictions, in part by penetrating 
sites—like detention centers—that are typically hidden from view, 
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the youth introduced to public discourse other reformist strategies 
and vocabulary.73 
Building on these new strategies and honing their reformist ef-
forts, beginning in July 2013, the “Dream Nine,” leaders in the U.S. 
undocumented youth movement also associated with NIYA, crossed 
the border to Mexico and turned themselves in at the border along-
side other undocumented people who had left voluntarily or had 
been removed from the United States.74 Their plan, in initiating this 
campaign to “Bring Them Home,” was to demand to be allowed to 
return to the United States with applications for humanitarian parole 
and other relief in hand—relief for which they may qualify, but 
which is not traditionally sought by long-term residents of the 
United States or recent deportees.75 The activists publicized their ac-
tions through the national and international media, brazenly claim-
ing lawful membership despite their lack of generally recognized 
legal status. The youth also linked their membership claims to those 
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of more vulnerable and less sympathetic community members by 
demanding entry alongside others differently situated, and forcing 
the state’s hand by calling upon purportedly shared values.76 
Among the Dream Nine were Lizbeth Mateo, Lulu Martinez, 
and Marco Saavedra.77 Lizbeth Mateo was raised in Los Angeles, it 
had been fifteen years since she had seen her family in Mexico, and 
she was just about to begin her first year of law school at Santa Clara 
University School of Law.78 Lulu Martinez immigrated to the 
United States at age three, and Saavedra, a graduate of Kenyon Col-
lege in Ohio and a poet and painter, also immigrated as a child and 
worked at his family’s restaurant in New York City.79 All are un-
documented and risked being prohibited from entering the United 
States, or being criminally prosecuted for immigration-fraud-related 
offenses.80 Yet, in the demand to “Bring Them Home,” the Dream 
Nine called upon egalitarian and humanist values in U.S. constitu-
tional and civic traditions, and dramatized the interconnection of the 
Dream Nine’s fates with those of others vulnerable to deportation, 
as well as the more than 1.7 million who have already been removed 
from the United States.81 
As Prerna Lal, a formerly undocumented youth organizer, 
Dreamer, and lawyer, relayed in her essay Why I Support the Bring 
Them Home Campaign: 
Lulu, Lizbeth and Marco are placing incredibly faith 
in our laws, in our sense of justice, and in our ability 
to do the right thing for them and the 1.7 million de-
ported by Obama’s deportation regime. If they fail to 
make it to the United States, it is not their failure. It 
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is our failure to respect, honor and uphold human 
life, human rights and dignity . . . .82 
One scholarly commentator has characterized similar claims of 
unauthorized migrants for inclusion despite their status as “present-
ing states with an existential dilemma: either treat people as humans 
and risk changing who you are (in terms of the composition of your 
population), or give up human rights and risk changing who you are 
(in terms of your constitutive commitments).”83 NIYA and the 
“Bring Them Home” participants present this challenge unequivo-
cally: either admit these young people who are members of the U.S. 
polity but for their immigration status, as well as those many others 
deported from the United States whose lives and fates are connected, 
or risk losing claim to equality, lenity, and meritocracy as core 
American values. 
The activists’ demands also directly challenge other conceptual 
and legal bases of U.S. immigration law enforcement, which gener-
ally differentiate “good” from “bad” and “criminal” aliens, primar-
ily along lines of legal status and law-breaking. The “Bring Them 
Home” actions upend this logic by insisting on a claim of belonging 
despite a lack of legal status, tying that claim of belonging to all of 
the more than 1.7 million deported, doing so while engaging in law-
breaking, and invoking a deeper faith in and form of law and jus-
tice.84 
Critical also to the interventions of the NIYA activists is their 
direct challenge to the equation of immigration law-breaking with 
criminality—a flawed premise at the core of the Lopez-Mendoza 
majority opinion and much regressive immigration law and policy.85 
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This challenge unfolds through ongoing protests and in the circula-
tion of graphic art challenging criminal-immigration enforcement.86 
Youth activists have sought instead to align immigration law-
breaking with other social movements that have worked to remove 
shame from socially subordinated statuses. In publicly claiming the 
status “undocumented,” the youth activists seek to confer upon that 
identity strength and pride—mobilizing a complicated array of as-
sociations, and likening “coming out” of the closet as queer and 
proud to fearlessly proclaiming one’s undocumented status or “com-
ing out as undocumented and unafraid.”87 
The “Bring Them Home” campaign has effectively enabled ad-
ditional infiltrations, as certain participants were placed in detention 
upon entering the United States.88 Once detained, the Dream Nine 
began to organize to address conditions of confinement at Eloy de-
tention center in Arizona—a large detention center administered by 
Corrections Corporation of America, a private prison company that 
contracts with Immigration and Customs Enforcement.89 Certain of 
the youth activists began a hunger strike and were placed in solitary 
confinement as a disciplinary measure.90 
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Lulu Martinez, a member of the Dream Nine detained at Eloy, 
faced disciplinary charges and solitary confinement for “prohibited 
act #213 – Group Demonstration” after she sought to mobilize 
women who had been denied access to phone calls to attorneys, fam-
ily, and friends.91 Her “Detainee Statement,” submitted as evidence 
at her hearing, captures further dimensions of the youth activists’ 
organizing approach. Martinez wrote the following in her statement 
submitted for consideration at her disciplinary hearing, where she 
faced a solitary confinement sentence: 
Several female inmates including myself have not 
been able to make calls to our attorney, family and 
friends. All of my calls have been restricted and I 
have asked countless times to be instructed on how 
to resolve the issue. The detainee handbook supple-
ment indicates we should have been allowed to make 
a call within a 24 hr period from the time that we re-
quested assistance. Also several inmates have been 
advised/warned/intimidated by CCA staff to not 
speak, communicate or interact with myself and 
other Charlie inmates. On one occasion detainee Liz-
beth Mateo and myself requested to see Ms. Villa 
about the issues mentioned above, however, we 
never received notice/a reply from her. Overall com-
munication with inmates, staff and family and attor-
neys outside the facility has been severely limited or 
completely restricted. Several inmates and myself 
have cooperated and abided by the regulations and 
policy to resolve the above mentioned issues/con-
cerns. Today during dinner chow, inmate Maria and 
myself announced out loud that we were distributing 
a free legal hotline number for the female inmates 
who could not afford and did not have legal repre-
sentation. We also communicated that if they were 
being treated unjustly they had to speak up. I know 
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that many do not speak or read Spanish and/or Eng-
lish and are never informed about the policy/regula-
tion at this facility and therefore do not document 
concerns. In the spirit of love and community Maria 
Ines and myself chanted “Sin papeles y sin miedo” 
“Las calles son del pueblo, el pueblo donde esta? El 
pueblo esta en las calles exiendo libertad”. We were 
then escorted out of the eating area and the other fe-
male inmates were not allowed to leave. . . .92 
Lulu Martinez was sentenced to fifteen days of disciplinary seg-
regation, effectively, solitary confinement.93 In total, six of the 
Dream Nine were placed in solitary confinement.94  
The actions and protests of the Dream Nine were then publicized 
by NIYA organizers outside detention to call media attention, as 
well as government officials’ focus, to the plight of non-violent per-
sons—including youth like Martinez—who are placed in solitary 
confinement for extended periods in purportedly civil detention for 
the purpose of immigration case processing.95Only a few days after 
the Dream Nine’s initial confinement, thirty-three Arizona lawmak-
ers wrote to President Obama to express support for those immigrant 
youth placed in solitary confinement, recognizing the youth activists 
as “victims of our broken immigration policy.”96 Lawmakers urged 
that the youth activists “deserve to come home to the United States,” 
and praised the Dreamers for taking “this courageous step  . . .  
fighting to reunite families separated by the border and mass depor-
tation policies . . . .”97 
Shortly after, the administration issued new regulations limiting 
the use of disciplinary segregation or solitary confinement in immi-
gration detention centers.98 And the Obama administration released 
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all of the Dream Nine into the United States, indicating, at least for 
the time being a choice to adhere publicly to certain constitutive 
commitments of an egalitarian and integrationist character.99 
The youth activists have made plausible claims that once seemed 
implausible.100 By claiming the power to transform immigration law 
and policy through raising undocumented voices and visibility, by 
enacting those transformed power relationships from within infil-
trated immigration detention centers, and claiming rights beyond 
those that U.S. law presently contemplates, NIYA’s youth leaders 
simultaneously perform and enact their rallying cry—“undocu-
mented and unafraid.” 
The youths’ increasingly visible activist engagement has also 
coincided with a broader shift in public opinion about the legitimacy 
of immigration enforcement and detention practices. A New York 
Times editorial published several months later, “End Immigration 
Detention,” deems U.S. immigration detention “the most indefensi-
ble” part of “all the malfunctioning parts in the country’s broken-
down immigration machinery,” noting how it “shatters families and 
traumatizes children.”101 
Saavedra, a Dreamer and infiltrator, explains NIYA’s civil dis-
obedient tactics as efforts, in his own words, “to subvert hegemonic 
relationships . . . through the theater of the oppressed.”102 Saavedra’s 
account of NIYA’s immigrant rights advocacy insists that the rights 
sought already belong to undocumented people: “We’re human be-
ings. We have a claim to rights because, yes, they rightfully belong 
to us.”103 This formulation fundamentally unsettles immigration 
law’s existing sovereign restrictionist logic and harsh enforcement 
strategies, both by attributing lawfulness and rightfulness to those 
elsewhere maligned as law-breakers—inmates in disciplinary seg-
regation or solitary confinement, and those Justice O’Connor in 
Lopez-Mendoza deems a criminal class—and by modeling reconfig-
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ured regulatory processes in which impacted persons have a power-
ful participatory role.104 In all of these settings, NIYA’s civil diso-
bedience claims higher moral and legal legitimacy for its side and 
seeks to provoke executive-level and legislative change in line with 
its agenda—in a manner reminiscent of a tradition of civil disobedi-
ence that runs from Saint Thomas Aquinas to Martin Luther King’s 
Letter from Birmingham Jail. 
On September 30, 2013, the “Bring Them Home” campaign 
continued as the “Dream Thirty” presented themselves at the Laredo 
port of entry, sporting caps and gowns, and seeking permission to 
enter the United States, while chanting en masse “undocumented 
and unafraid.”105 Almost three-dozen people marched across the 
U.S.-Mexico border—thirty-four individuals in total, including sev-
eral minors accompanied by their adult family members.106 As with 
the “Dream Nine,” the “Dream Thirty” were initially detained, but 
within hours, some of them were released into the United States.107 
The “Dream Thirty” action underscored the impossibility of us-
ing a large-scale removal program to appropriately sort deserving 
from undeserving non-citizens, as U.S. citizen children are effec-
tively removed along with their illegally present parents. One of the 
“Dream Thirty” admitted to the United States immediately follow-
ing the cross-border action is Elsy Nunez, who is a Honduran na-
tional and once undocumented resident of the United States, as well 
as the mother of a four-year old U.S.-born daughter, Valeria, who 
suffers from cerebral palsy and a ruptured eardrum. Despite repeated 
attempts to re-enter the country, Nunez had been turned away and 
had been unable to access medical care for her daughter. But after 
participating in the Dream Thirty action, she obtained entry to the 
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United States.108 Also among the Dream Thirty released immedi-
ately into the United States were several other parents and children 
who traveled together, with the children ranging in age from thirteen 
to sixteen.109 
The Dream Thirty likewise sought humanitarian parole, a form 
of exception to typical immigration procedures granted to address 
humanitarian emergencies.110 In addition to claiming humanitarian 
emergency, the Dream Nine’s attorney, Margo Cowan, has ex-
plained: “For all intents and purposes, they are Americans, except 
for on paper”111—again, a fundamental challenge to the categories 
and distinctions that ground immigration law enforcement. The ac-
tivists’ disobedience lies not only in refusing to remain silent and in 
provocatively challenging immigration law enforcement, but also in 
aggressively using the law against itself. The immigrant youth ac-
tivists demand to cross the border en masse in ways not contem-
plated by existing legal frameworks and arguably in violation of ex-
isting law. In so doing, the youth activists have forced the law to 
bend to their demands (in a more public manner than immigration 
adjudication, even with enhanced procedural protections would per-
mit), or lose its claim to legitimacy. 
III. RE-IMAGINING IMMIGRATION REFORM 
What forms of immigration justice are suggested, then, by these 
disobedient Dreamers? In decrying the illegitimacy of deportation—
by insisting that there be “Not One More Deportation”—the youth 
activists have staked out a position that re-conceptualizes the immi-
gration debate and places the burden on those who aim to curtail the 
human right to freedom of movement. 
Although the Dreamers’ claims to a “right to remain” and “free-
dom of movement” may seem an especially radical reconceptualiza-
tion of U.S. immigration norms, these youth invoke a deep and 
longstanding current in U.S. political discourse—and even in U.S. 
constitutional law—that embraces a human right to freedom of 
movement. In Kent v. Dulles, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court 
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recognized a tradition in U.S. constitutional law that echoes the 
youth activists’ claim. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, de-
clared: “Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values.”112 
The Court further noted that the freedom of movement is “deeply 
engrained in our history”: 
Freedom of movement across frontiers in either di-
rection, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our 
heritage. Travel abroad, like travel within the coun-
try, may be necessary for a livelihood. It may be as 
close to the heart of the individual as the choice of 
what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of move-
ment is basic in our scheme of values.113 
Moreover, the human right to flee one’s state is widely known 
and explicitly adopted in the Declaration on Human Rights, Article 
13, as are the moral claims of people for family unity, political ex-
pression, and other basic human needs.114 But to recognize those 
other fundamental rights, as the youth activists powerfully contend, 
requires recognition of a human right and a moral right to move, and 
also a moral right for sufficiently just and livable conditions that one 
might choose to stay.115 
Rather than a call for open borders, the youth activists may be 
understood, in their exhortation that there be “not one more depor-
tation,” to invoke an ethic of positive abolition in the immigration 
reform context.116 The early twentieth century scholar and activist 
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W.E.B. Du Bois understood abolition to be not just a negative pro-
ject of eliminating the institution of slavery, but also a positive pro-
ject of building substitutive social democratic forms of coexistence 
that would meaningfully displace that unjust and dehumanizing in-
stitution.117 According to Du Bois, Reconstruction failed, in signifi-
cant part, because the abolition of slavery was not accompanied by 
the establishment of other egalitarian social and political institutions 
and frameworks for democratic coexistence.118 Positive, substitutive 
abolition in the immigration context likewise contemplates a con-
stellation of substitutive alternatives to immigration restrictions that 
enable a right to freedom of movement, including a right to remain, 
and that would tether immigration regulation to economic develop-
ment and other measures to address human needs rather than restric-
tionist border enforcement.119 
Can we imagine a world in which efforts to regulate immigration 
operate by addressing the push and pull factors that drive migration 
rather than through a criminal-typed framework of immigration en-
forcement and a criminal-typed procedurally focused vision of im-
migration justice? Much of what sustains especially large-scale mi-
gration is the capacity to earn more and remit monies home or to 
flee violence and insecurity. Targeted programs to shape the push 
factors that cause people to move in large numbers, that incentivize 
return, and that enable a right to stay would do much to address those 
large-scale migrations that are the cause of most concern in receiv-
ing states. And they would do so in a way less linked to mass human 
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suffering than our current multi-billion dollar border fortification ef-
forts, which have operated during a period when millions of people 
in fact immigrated to the United States without authorization. Of 
course, the question remains: how might we get from a space of per-
vasive criminalization that is hard even for those committed to re-
form to imagine beyond to a political space in which immigration 
might be addressed through focusing on its underlying causes and 
consequences and recognizing the deep human needs migration en-
ables? 
CONCLUSION 
In responding to the urgent call to repair our failing immigration 
laws and policies, the bold disobedience of the Dreamers may not 
be replicated by those who study immigration law, administer im-
migration regulations, serve as legal advocates, or are tasked with 
enabling legislative reform. But something of the Dreamers’ im-
pulse toward justice, their courage in re-conceptualizing the terms 
of the debate, and their invocation of a higher form of law may al-
ready have emboldened those who have sought to humanize U.S. 
immigration regulation within and outside the government—and it 
ought, in turn, to expand our collective imagination. 
